Posts Tagged ‘ Philosophy of Statistics ’

U-Phil: How should “prior information” enter in statistical inference?

September 12, 2012
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U-Phil: How should “prior information” enter in statistical inference?

Andrew Gelman, sent me an interesting note of his, “Ethics and the statistical use of prior information,”[i]. In section 3 he comments on some of David Cox’s remarks in a conversation we recorded:  “A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo,” published in Rationality, Markets and [...]

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Return to the comedy hour…(on significance tests)

September 9, 2012
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Return to the comedy hour…(on significance tests)

These days, so many theater productions are updated reviews of older standards. Same with the comedy hours at the Bayesian retreat, and task force meetings of significance test reformers. So (on the 1-year anniversary of this blog) let’s listen in to one of the earliest routines (with highest blog hits), but with some new reflections [...]

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Stephen Senn: The nuisance parameter nuisance

September 6, 2012
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Stephen Senn: The nuisance parameter nuisance

Stephen Senn Competence Centre for Methodology and Statistics CRP Santé Strassen, Luxembourg “The nuisance parameter nuisance”  A great deal of statistical debate concerns ‘univariate’ error, or disturbance, terms in models. I put ‘univariate’ in inverted commas because as soon as one writes a model of the form (say) Yi =Xiβ + Єi, i = 1 [...]

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After dinner Bayesian comedy hour….

September 3, 2012
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After dinner Bayesian comedy hour….

Given it’s the first anniversary of this blog, which opened with the howlers in “Overheard at the comedy hour …” let’s listen in as a Bayesian holds forth on one of the most famous howlers of the lot: the mysterious role that psychological intentions are said to play in frequentist methods such as statistical significance [...]

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Failing to Apply vs Violating the Likelihood Principle

September 1, 2012
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Failing to Apply vs Violating the Likelihood Principle

In writing a new chapter on the Strong Likelihood Principle [i] the past few weeks, I noticed a passage in G. Casella and R. Berger (2002) that in turn recalled a puzzling remark noted in my Jan. 3, 2012 post. The post began: A question arose from a Bayesian acquaintance: “Although the Birnbaum result is [...]

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“Did Higgs Physicists Miss an Opportunity by Not Consulting More With Statisticians?”

August 25, 2012
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“Did Higgs Physicists Miss an Opportunity by Not Consulting More With Statisticians?”

On August 20 I posted the start of  “Discussion and Digest” by Bayesian statistician Tony O’Hagan– an oveview of  responses to his letter (ISBA website) on the use of p-values in analyzing the Higgs data, prompted, in turn, by a query of subjective Bayesian Dennis Lindley.  I now post the final section in which he [...]

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Higgs Boson: Bayesian “Digest and Discussion”

August 20, 2012
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Higgs Boson: Bayesian “Digest and Discussion”

Professor  O’Hagan sent around (to the ISBA list ) his summary of the comments he received in response to his request for information about the use of p-values in in relation to the Higgs boson data. My original July 11 post including O’Hagan’s initial letter is here.  His “digest” begins: Before going further, I should say [...]

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A. Spanos: Egon Pearson’s Neglected Contributions to Statistics

August 18, 2012
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A. Spanos: Egon Pearson’s Neglected Contributions to Statistics

Continuing with the discussion of E.S. Pearson: Egon Pearson’s Neglected Contributions to Statistics by Aris Spanos     Egon Pearson (11 August 1895 – 12 June 1980), is widely known today for his contribution in recasting of Fisher’s significance testing into the Neyman-Pearson (1933) theory of hypothesis testing. Occasionally, he is also credited with contributions in promoting [...]

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E.S. Pearson’s Statistical Philosophy

August 16, 2012
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E.S. Pearson’s Statistical Philosophy

Egon Sharpe (E.S.) Pearson’s birthday was August 11.  This slightly belated birthday discussion is directly connected to the question of the uses to which frequentist methods may be put in inquiry.  Are they limited to supplying procedures which will not err too frequently in some vast long run? Or are these long run results of [...]

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Good Scientist Badge of Approval?

August 14, 2012
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Good Scientist Badge of Approval?

In an attempt to fix the problem of “unreal” results in science some have started a “reproducibility initiative”. Think of the incentive for being explicit about how the results were obtained the first time….But would researchers really pay to have their potential errors unearthed in this way?  Even for a “good scientist” badge of approval? [...]

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