Thanks to Emrah Aktunc and Christian Hennig for their U-Phils on my September 12 post: “How should ‘prior information’ enter in statistical inference?” and my subsequent deconstruction of Gelman[i] (starting here, and ending with part 3). I’ll begin with some remarks on Emrah Aktunc’s contribution. First, we need to avoid an ambiguity that clouds prior [...]
I am posting two U-Phils I received in relation to the 9/12 call call on Andrew Gelman’s (2012): “Ethics and the statistical use of prior information” A Deconstruction of Gelman by Mayo in 3 parts: (10/5/12) Part 1: “A Bayesian wants everybody else to be a non-Bayesian” (10/7/12) Part 2: Using prior Information (10/9/12) Part [...]
Please see parts 1 and 2 and links therein. The background began in my Sept 12 post. Gelman (2012) considers a case where the overall available evidence, E, is at odds with the indication of the results x from a given study: Consider the notorious study in which a random sample of a few thousand [...]
(Please see part 1 for links and references): A Bayesian, Gelman tells us, “wants everybody else to be a non-Bayesian” (p. 5). Despite appearances, the claim need not be seen as self-contradictory, at least if we interpret it most generously, as Rule #2 (of this blog) directs. Whether or not “a Bayesian” refers to all [...]
I was to have philosophically deconstructed a few paragraphs from (the last couple of sections) in a column Andrew Gelman sent me on “Ethics and the statistical use of prior information”[i]. The discussion begins with my Sept 12 post, and follows through several posts over the second half of September (see [ii]), all by way [...]
Stephen Senn Competence Centre for Methodology and Statistics CRP Santé Strassen, Luxembourg George Barnard has had an important influence on the way I think about statistics. It was hearing him lecture in Aberdeen (I think) in the early 1980s (I think) on certain problems associated with Neyman confidence intervals that woke me to the problem [...]
Many fallacious uses of statistical methods result from supposing that the statistical inference licenses a jump to a substantive claim that is ‘on a different level’ from a statistical one being probed. Given the familiar refrain that statistical significance is not substantive significance, it may seem surprising how often criticisms of significance tests depend on [...]
In the early ‘80s, fresh out of graduate school, I persuaded Persi Diaconis, Jack Good, and Patrick Suppes to participate in a session I wanted to organize on ESP and statistics. It seems remarkable to me now—not only that they agreed to participate*, but the extent that PSI research was taken seriously at the time. [...]
G.A. Barnard’s birthday is 9/23, so, here’s a snippet of his discussion with Savage (1962) (link below [i]) that connects to our 2 recent issues: stopping rules, and background information here and here (at least of one type). Barnard: I have been made to think further about this issue of the stopping rule since I [...]
For the second* bit of background on the use of background info (for the new U-Phil for 9/21/12 9/25/12, I’ll reblog: Background Knowledge: Not to Quantify, But To Avoid Being Misled By, Subjective Beliefs …I am discovering that one of the biggest sources of confusion about the foundations of statistics has to do with what [...]
