Posts Tagged ‘ Bayesian/frequentist ’

The ASA Document on P-Values: One Year On

March 8, 2017
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The ASA Document on P-Values: One Year On

I’m surprised it’s a year already since posting my published comments on the ASA Document on P-Values. Since then, there have been a slew of papers rehearsing the well-worn fallacies of tests (a tad bit more than the usual rate). Doubtless, the P-value Pow Wow raised people’s consciousnesses. I’m interested in hearing reader reactions/experiences in connection with […]

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Er, about those “other statistical approaches”: Hold off until a balanced critique is in?

April 1, 2016
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Er, about those “other statistical approaches”: Hold off until a balanced critique is in?

I could have told them that the degree of accordance enabling the “6 principles” on p-values was unlikely to be replicated when it came to most of the “other approaches” with which some would supplement or replace significance tests– notably Bayesian updating, Bayes factors, or likelihood ratios (confidence intervals are dual to hypotheses tests). [My commentary […]

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“On the Brittleness of Bayesian Inference,” Owhadi, Scovel, and Sullivan (PUBLISHED)

January 12, 2016
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“On the Brittleness of Bayesian Inference,” Owhadi, Scovel, and Sullivan (PUBLISHED)

The record number of hits on this blog goes to “When Bayesian Inference shatters,” where Houman Owhadi presents a “Plain Jane” explanation of results now published in “On the Brittleness of Bayesian Inference”. A follow-up was 1 year ago. Here’s how their paper begins:     Houman Owhadi Professor of Applied and Computational Mathematics and Control and Dynamical Systems, Computing + Mathematical […]

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Gelman on ‘Gathering of philosophers and physicists unaware of modern reconciliation of Bayes and Popper’

December 17, 2015
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Gelman on ‘Gathering of philosophers and physicists unaware of modern reconciliation of Bayes and Popper’

  I’m reblogging Gelman’s post today: “Gathering of philosophers and physicists unaware of modern reconciliation of Bayes and Popper”. I concur with Gelman’s arguments against all Bayesian “inductive support” philosophies, and welcome the Gelman and Shalizi (2013) ‘meeting of the minds’ between an error statistical philosophy and Bayesian falsification (which I regard as a kind of error statistical Bayesianism). […]

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Return to the Comedy Hour: P-values vs posterior probabilities (1)

November 29, 2015
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Return to the Comedy Hour: P-values vs posterior probabilities (1)

Some recent criticisms of statistical tests of significance have breathed brand new life into some very old howlers, many of which have been discussed on this blog. One variant that returns to the scene every decade I think (for 50+ years?), takes a “disagreement on numbers” to show a problem with significance tests even from a “frequentist” perspective.  Since it’s […]

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S. McKinney: On Efron’s “Frequentist Accuracy of Bayesian Estimates” (Guest Post)

November 6, 2015
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S. McKinney: On Efron’s “Frequentist Accuracy of Bayesian Estimates” (Guest Post)

Steven McKinney, Ph.D. Statistician Molecular Oncology and Breast Cancer Program British Columbia Cancer Research Centre                      On Bradley Efron’s: “Frequentist Accuracy of Bayesian Estimates” Bradley Efron has produced another fine set of results, yielding a valuable estimate of variability for a Bayesian estimate derived from a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm, in his latest paper […]

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Statistical “reforms” without philosophy are blind (v update)

October 18, 2015
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Statistical “reforms” without philosophy are blind (v update)

Is it possible, today, to have a fair-minded engagement with debates over statistical foundations? I’m not sure, but I know it is becoming of pressing importance to try. Increasingly, people are getting serious about methodological reforms—some are quite welcome, others are quite radical. Too rarely do the reformers bring out the philosophical presuppositions of the criticisms and proposed […]

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Oy Faye! What are the odds of not conflating simple conditional probability and likelihood with Bayesian success stories?

October 1, 2015
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Oy Faye! What are the odds of not conflating simple conditional probability and likelihood with Bayesian success stories?

ONE YEAR AGO, the NYT “Science Times” (9/29/14) published Fay Flam’s article, first blogged here. Congratulations to Faye Flam for finally getting her article published at the Science Times at the New York Times, “The odds, continually updated” after months of reworking and editing, interviewing and reinterviewing. I’m grateful that one remark from me remained. Seriously I am. […]

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(Part 2) Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis

September 12, 2015
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(Part 2) Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis

Continuation of “Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis” Deborah G. Mayo Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Volume 41, Number 2, 2005, pp. 299-319 Part 1 is here. There are two other points of confusion in critical discussions of the SCT, that we may note here: I. The […]

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Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis (Part I)

September 11, 2015
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Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis (Part I)

Yesterday was C.S. Peirce’s birthday. He’s one of my all time heroes. You should read him: he’s a treasure chest on essentially any topic. I only recently discovered a passage where Popper calls Peirce one of the greatest philosophical thinkers ever (I don’t have it handy). If Popper had taken a few more pages from Peirce, he would have […]

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